Montana Law Review
Volume 69
Issue 1 Winter 2008

Article 8

1-2008

Recent Decisions Affecting the Montana Practitioner

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
, Recent Decisions Affecting the Montana Practitioner, 69 Mont. L. Rev. 283 (2008).
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/8

This Legal Shorts is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

et al.: Recent Decisions

LEGAL SHORTS

RECENT DECISIONS AFFECTING
THE MONTANA PRACTITIONER
I.

FAULCONBRIDGE V. STATE'

In Faulconbridge v. State, the Montana Supreme Court remanded on the single issue of admissibility of evidence of a "substantially similar" accident. 2 Nonetheless, the Court took the opportunity to address additional issues likely to be raised at retrial. 3 Some objections were case-specific. However, in
addressing the other issues, the Court took a clear stand on several important evidentiary topics-when to disclose hybrid witnesses, when a trial representative can testify in a courtroom
when witnesses are excluded, when a negligent driver is a superseding cause of the defendant's liability, and when non-party conduct is admissible-which make Faulconbridge useful precedent
for Montana practitioners.
On August 7, 1992, Elisha Faulconbridge died due to injuries
she sustained in a motorcycle accident in which she was a passenger. The motorcycle crashed into a cement abutment when the
driver, Jason Weaver, failed to negotiate a ninety-degree turn on
Juniper Drive in Missoula.4 In 1994, Elisha's parents brought a
wrongful death and survivorship action against the State, Montana Rail Link (MRL) and Missoula County (County).5 Elisha's
parents alleged that Juniper Drive's dangerous condition caused
the accident because there were no signs warning of the gravel
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Faulconbridge v. State, 142 P.3d 777 (Mont. 2006).
Id. at 785.
Id.
Id. at 783.
Id. at 782.
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surface or the approaching sharp curve. 6 Due to complicated pretrial motions and settlements, it took ten years for the case to go
7
to trial, with the State remaining as the sole defendant. The trial
s
lasted ten days, ending with a jury verdict in favor of the State.
Due to the delay between the accident, the trial, and the Faulconbridges' settlement with three of the parties, the district court was
often faced with problems of apportioning liability to parties not at
trial.9 The Faulconbridges appealed on eight issues and the State
10
cross-appealed on three issues in the event of a retrial.
The FaulconbridgeCourt quickly disposed of four issues because either the Court had resolved the issue through its disposition of another issue, the issue would be decided at the retrial, the
issue was moot, or the precedent supporting the objection was
clearly misunderstood by the party.'1 Thus, the issues remaining
for discussion were: (1) whether excluding evidence of a prior accident was an abuse of discretion; (2) whether excluding testimony
due to non-disclosure of an expert witness was an abuse of discretion; (3) whether allowing the State's trial representative, a retired employee who listened to numerous witnesses, to testify as a
fact witness even after witnesses were excluded from trial was an
abuse of discretion; (4) whether excluding evidence of a nonparty's conduct to apportion liability and to show comparative
negligence was an abuse of discretion; and (5) whether a question
of fact existed as to whether the State owed a duty to maintain the
road when it assigned its responsibilities prior to the accident.
The Court remanded Faulconbridgeat the outset of its opinion. The Court ordered the district court to allow evidence of a
6. Id. at 783.
7. MRL brought a third-party action against Jason, who counterclaimed against MRL
and cross-claimed against the County and the State. The State responded with a crosscomplaint against Jason for contribution and indemnity. Ultimately, MRL dismissed its
claim against Jason, who dismissed his action against MRL. After Jason filed a motion to
dismiss against the State, the State dismissed him from the action. The Faulconbridges
settled with Jason, MRL, and the County. Id.
8. Faulconbridge, 142 P.3d at 782.
9. Id. at 783.
10. Id. at 782-83.
11. Id. at 784 (deciding that decision on motion to quash was moot because Faulconbridges provided the precise information the order would have quashed); id. at 789 (declining to address the issue of whether the district court erred in refusing to grant a new trial
because the Court already ordered a new trial); id. (reiteration of previous holding that
"violation of the [Montana Uniform Traffic Control Devices Handbook] is merely admissible
to show negligence" and not negligence per se) (internal citations omitted); id. at 794 (declining to address issue of "opening door" to evidence of intoxication because the Court
remanded on other issues).
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"substantially similar" prior accident to show knowledge of a dangerous condition on Juniper Drive. 12 Generally, evidence of other
accidents is inadmissible to show negligence. 13 However, if a prior
accident is "substantially similar" it may be admitted to show the
"existence of a danger or defect and notice or knowledge
thereof."14 When the "sole purpose of the evidence [is to] demonstrat[e] notice or knowledge" of a dangerous condition, the requirements are relaxed. 15 On such occasions, the differences between the accidents go not to admissibility, but to the weight of
the evidence. Opposing counsel is then given the opportunity to
emphasize the differences on cross-examination. 16
The Court has admitted evidence of "substantially similar"
accidents in the following circumstances: evidence of a prior slip
and fall accident because it also occurred under winter conditions
a few days earlier in the same parking lot;1 7 evidence of a prior
injury by a railroad worker while moving railroad ties because the
accident occurred in the same place under the same foreman even
though the prior injury occurred six years earlier;' and evidence
of prior accidents with a hay baler of any brand, not just those
made by the manufacturer at issue in the case.' 9 The Court summarized its review of admissible, "substantially similar" evidence
by stating, "[t]he holdings in these cases follow the general principal that courts should admit the evidence unless some good reason
exists to exclude it."20
The Faulconbridge Court held that excluding evidence of a
1986 accident was an abuse of discretion because similar circumstances existed between the 1986 accident and the instant case. 2 '
The State attempted to persuade the Court that the two accidents
were dissimilar because one involved a motorcycle and the other a
vehicle, the accidents occurred at different times of day, and no
warning sign was present in the 1986 accident. 2 2 However, the
12. Id. at 785.
13. Id. at 784 (citing Kissock v. Butte Convalescent Ctr., 992 P.2d 1271, 1274 (Mont.
1999)).
14. Faulconbridge,142 P.3d at 784.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Kissock, 992 P.2d at 1275-76.
18. Kalanick v. BurlingtonN. R.R. Co., 788 P.2d 901, 906 (Mont. 1990).
19. Tacke v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 713 P.2d 527, 532 (Mont. 1986).
20. Faulconbridge,142 P.3d at 785 (quoting Commission Comments to Mont. R. Evid.
102) (internal quotations omitted).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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Court disagreed with the State and held that the circumstances of
the two accidents were more similar than dissimilar. The locations were identical, both accident reports mentioned a lack of
warning signs, both drivers were traveling at the same speed and
were unfamiliar with the road, and the road surface in both acci23 The
dents consisted of sand and gravel on top of pavement.
Court found the 1986 accident relevant to the State's notice of a
potentially dangerous road condition, road defect, and causation,
and remanded the case for a new trial. At this point, the Court
recognized many issues would arise again at retrial. Thus, it took
"this opportunity to address the other evidentiary issues raised by
24
the parties."
Although it was unnecessary to rule on the remaining issues,
the Court clarified many general evidentiary topics important to
attorneys. In the second issue, the Court considered whether a
"hybrid" witness-one with both personal knowledge and the capability of giving expert testimony-not retained prior to trial
must be disclosed pursuant to Montana Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4). 2 5 The Faulconbridges wished to call as a witness Ken
Kailey, a Missoula County traffic supervisor, but did not disclose
him as an expert, asserting Kailey was a "hybrid" witness because
he more closely resembled a treating physician in a personal injury case. The Faulconbridges contended this meant Kailey was
not subject to the Rule 26(b)(4) disclosure under the Court's holding in Ostermiller v. Alvord.26 The Court disagreed with this categorical interpretation of the Ostermillerholding and clarified that
the true distinction determining disclosure requirements under
Rule 26(b)(4) was between witnesses retained before trial, who
27
must be disclosed, and those who are not retained before trial.
The Court refused to set any bright-line disclosure requirements
for hybrid witnesses, including Kailey, leaving the question to the
discretion of the district court "to be exercised dependent on pretrial circumstances." 28 However, to avoid having witnesses' testi23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 785-86.
26. Faulconbridge,142 P.3d at 786 (citing Ostermiller v. Alvord, 720 P.2d 1198 (Mont.
1986) (concluding the testimony of a "hybrid" witness, a treating physician, was admissible
although not disclosed under Mont. R. Civ. P. Rule 26(b)(4) because no surprise resulted
from his testimony because he was listed as a witness, both parties deposed him, and the
defendant failed to allege surprise)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
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mony excluded on a technicality, the Court warned parties to "err
on the side of caution" if considering calling a hybrid witness. 2 9
"The better practice is to identify such witnesses as expert witnesses in response to interrogatories, and to provide any sort of
expert disclosure for such witnesses as the Rules of Civil Procedure and the district court may require. '30
On its third issue, the Faulconbridge Court strictly interpreted Montana Rule of Evidence 615 and reached two conclusions: first, a party's trial representative may testify as a fact witness even after witnesses are excluded from the courtroom; 3 1 and
second, a former employee cannot serve as a trial representative. 3 2 The Faulconbridges objected to the testimony of the State's
chosen trial representative, James Weaver, because, although the
district court ordered witnesses excluded from the courtroom,
Weaver testified as a fact witness after sitting in on the testimony
of numerous witnesses. 3 3 Rule 615 allows for the exclusion of witnesses from trial upon motion by either the parties or the judge.
However, someone who is: (1) a natural person; and (2) an "officer
or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as
its representative by its attorney" is excepted from exclusion. 34
The Court reasoned, "[t]here is no question that a person who is a
party may both attend and testify at his or her own trial ... legitimate constitutional concerns would present themselves should
this right be called into question." 35 Thus, trial representatives
are afforded the same rights as natural persons. With support
from the plain language of the Rule, the Court's reasoning, and
federal case law, 36 the Court overruled two previous decisions to
the extent their holdings contradicted the Faulconbridgeholding
29. Id. at 786-87.
30. Id. at 787.
31. Id. at 788.
32. Faulconbridge,142 P.3d at 789.
33. Id. at 787.
34. Mont. R. Evid. 615(1)-(2) (2005).
35. Faulconbridge,142 P.3d at 788.
36. Id. (citing Nanoski v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 874 F.2d 529, 531 (8th Cir.
1989) (concluding that "[a]n officer or employee of a party who has been designated as that
party's representative is not excludable"); Oliver B. Cannon and Son v. Fidelity and Cas.
Co., 519 F. Supp. 668, 679 (D. Del. 1981) (forcing plaintiff to choose which witness would be
representative so court could exclude the witness from the sequestration order); Queen v.
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 842 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding no error when
district court allowed representative to testify because she was exempt from sequestration
order)).
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to
that "Rule 615(2) permits a validly designated representative
37
testify."
and
trial,
the
during
courtroom
the
in
both remain
The Faulconbridges also contended that Weaver was unqualibecause he had retired and was a former
fied as a representative
"officer or employee." 38 The Court agreed, concluding that adding
the word "former" into the reading of Rule 615 would be "inserting
what has been omitted" in violation of Montana Code Annotated
would not
§ 1-2-101. 3 9 Accordingly, the Court held that Weaver
40
retrial.
the
at
representative
proper
a
as
qualify
The most complex and, arguably, most consequential issue in
Faulconbridge relates to when non-party conduct is admissible.
First, a defendant may not introduce non-party conduct to show
causation if an intervening cause is not superseding. However, a
party can introduce the same evidence if its purpose is to prove
comparative negligence. 4 1 Second, the negligent driver of a vehicle does not break the chain of causation to the defendant whose
duty it is to maintain the road because driver error is foreseeable. 4 2 In attempting to prove that Jason Weaver's conduct
caused the accident, not the road's condition, the State sought to
introduce evidence of Jason's conduct-alleged intoxication, excessive speed, and a skewed motorcycle headlight. 4 3 Although evidence of non-party conduct is generally inadmissible to apportion
liability, 4 4 the State argued that Pula v. State4 5 allowed non-party
conduct to negate causation. 46 The Court narrowed the issue to:
whether non-party conduct is admissible in any case to negate
causation where there are multiple causes or only in those where
37. Id. (overruling State v. Flowers, 86 P.3d 3 (Mont. 2004) and State v. Claric,894 P.2d
1206 (Mont. 1995)).
38. Id. (quoting Mont. R. Evid. 615(2)).
39. Id. at 789 (stating that the courts' role in interpreting statutes is "simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has
been omitted or to omit what has been inserted" (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 1-2-101)).
40. Id.
41. Faulconbridge, 142 P.3d at 792, 795 (citing Plumb v. Fourth Jud. Dist. Ct., Missoula Co., 927 P.2d 1011, 1021 (Mont. 1996) (stating the general rule that non-party conduct is inadmissible to apportion liability); Pula v. State, 40 P.3d 364, 367 (Mont. 2002)
(stating an exception to the Plumb rule is that non-party conduct is admissible to show an
intervening cause that negates causation); Buck v. State, 723 P.2d 210, 217 (Mont. 1986)
(stating the jury should be instructed on a passenger's comparative negligence if evidence
exists to show "that in the exercise of ordinary care the passenger should not have entered
the automobile because of the intoxication of the driver").
42. Id. at 793.
43. Id. at 791.
44. Id. at 792.
45. Pula, 40 P.3d at 364.
46. Faulconbridge, 142 P.3d at 792.
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a superseding cause is alleged.4 7 While warning parties that nonparty conduct evidence is not to be admitted "in an attempt to diminish [a party's] own responsibility," the Court concluded, "after
revisiting Pula and its subsequent application . . .a defendant
may introduce non-party conduct only for the purpose of demonstrating that the non-party conduct was a superseding interven48
ing cause of plaintiffs damages."
Next, the Court determined whether Jason's conduct was a
superseding cause of Elisha's death. If Jason's behavior was a superseding cause of the Faulconbridges' injuries, his conduct would
be admissible and the State's liability would be severed. In order
for an intervening cause to be considered superseding, it must be
unforeseeable. Said differently, "foreseeable actions do not break
the chain of causation." 4 9 The Faulconbridges requested the
Court to find Jason's actions were foreseeable as a matter of law
or that "reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion" that Jason's negligent driving was foreseeable. 50 Thus, the question the
Court sought to answer was whether a party who designs, maintains, and constructs roadways should "reasonably foresee as
probable" or "anticipate" that a driver might operate his vehicle
negligently on that highway. 5 1
In holding that a negligent driver is foreseeable as a matter of
law, the Court relied on Buck v. State.52 "The 'intervention of another force' (that being the conduct of the driver) does not relieve
the State of liability ... because it was 'idle to argue' that plaintiffs injuries were not foreseeable, or 'not reasonable to be expected to happen in a natural sequence of events.' "53 In sum, the
Court determined that non-party conduct is admissible if introduced for the purpose of proving an alleged superseding cause of
the plaintiffs injuries. Another general conclusion is that a driver
operating his vehicle negligently is foreseeable as a matter of law.
Thus, because a negligent driver is foreseeable as a matter of law,
a non-party driver's negligent conduct cannot be introduced to negate causation. Here, Jason's driving was not a superseding
cause, thus, his behavior was inadmissible to negate causation
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
1986)).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 793 (citing Cusenbary v. Mortensen, 987 P.2d 351, 355 (Mont. 1999)).
Id. (quoting Cusenbary, 987 P.2d at 358).
Id.
Cusenbary, 723 P.2d at 216.
Faulconbridge, 142 P.3d at 794 (quoting Buck v. State, 723 P.2d 210, 217 (Mont.
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and the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it.
However, this was not the end of the Court's analysis regarding
admissibility of Jason's conduct.
Although the Court determined Jason's conduct was inadmissible to apportion liability to a non-party and to negate causation,
it determined that Jason's conduct was admissible to show Elisha's comparative negligence 5 4 and to distinguish the accident
from the 1986 accident. 55 The Court dismissed the Faulconbridges' argument that a subjective standard applied to whether a
passenger of a vehicle was negligent. The Court's precedent dictates that comparative negligence is "based on evidence of negligence by reasonable and prudent person standards," and that
"comparative negligence is a question of fact for the jury to decide." 5 6 The State wished to introduce Jason's conduct as evidence
that Elisha was comparatively negligent-that Elisha knew or
should have known that Jason had been drinking, that his headlight was misaimed, and that he was speeding-thus, the Court
concluded, the district court abused its discretion when it excluded the evidence. This ruling was accompanied by a caution
that the evidence be used only for comparative negligence pur57
poses and not to apportion liability.
The final issues before the Court were those more specific to
the facts of Faulconbridge. First, the State appealed the district
court's denial of summary judgment as well as its exclusion of evidence pertaining to a contract in which the State assigned maintenance responsibilities to the County.58 The State claimed that
they owed no duty to individuals using Juniper Drive because the
maintenance agreement with the County took effect five weeks
prior to Elisha's accident. 59 The FaulconbridgeCourt determined
that a question of fact existed as "to what extent and how quickly
upon the road's transfer to the County under the maintenance
contract the County could have reasonably been expected to fix a
road that was arguably defective."6 0 The Court agreed with the
district court that the State's responsibility, which arose from its
54.
55.
56.
(Mont.
57.
(Mont.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 795 (citing Pula, 40 P.3d at 367).
Id. at 795 n. 4.
Id. at 795 (citing Lewis v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 29 P.3d 1028, 1032
2001); Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 872 P.2d 782, 790 (Mont. 1994)).
Id. at 795 (citing Plumb v. Fourth Jud. Dist. Ct., Missoula Co., 927 P.2d 1011, 1021
1996)).
Id. at 789-90.
Faulconbridge,142 P.3d at 789-90.
Id. at 790.
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construction of Juniper Drive, was not severed or lessened by the
existence of the maintenance agreement. 6 1 However, the Court
concluded that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence relating to the contract. Such evidence could be
presented at retrial because the condition of the road upon its
transfer to the County and whether the County could cure any
62
defects in five weeks were questions of fact.
Justice Warner, joined by Chief Justice Gray, dissented from
the Court's decision that evidence of the "substantially similar"
accident was admissible because the district court did not act arbitrarily nor "exceed the bounds of reason in reaching this conclusion."63 Justice Warner argued the Court inserted its own interpretation when it concluded the 1986 accident was more similar
than not, a conclusion he claimed was unsupported by the record. 6 4 Justice Warner contended that in the precedent relied
upon by the Court, the facts "show a great deal more similarity
between the instances discussed therein than the two accidents at
issue in the present case." 65 Justice Warner concluded that the
district court was well within the bounds of reason when it determined the accidents were not substantially similar because: (1)
safety considerations are different in car and motorcycle accidents; (2) day and night differ in the interplay of light on objects;
(3) differences in whether alcohol was a factor; (4) differences in
the presence of dust and its impact on vision and surface condi66 Justions; and (5) differences in the presence of warning signs.
tice Warner would have affirmed the judgment of the district
court.

6 7

In sum, the Court clarified several evidentiary issues important to practitioners in Montana. The Court underscored the importance of disclosing witnesses as experts and clarified requirements for trial representatives. Further, in holding that a nonparty's conduct is inadmissible to apportion liability but admissi61. Id.
62. Id. at 791.
63. Id. at 795-96 (Warner, J. & Gray, C.J., dissenting). Justice Warner also dissented
on two other issues. First, he would not reverse the judgment regarding allowing the trial
representative to testify because the Faulconbridges did not timely object to the appeal.
Second, he would conclude that the district court was not in error by denying the Faulconbridge's motion for a new trial because of a conflict of interest between the trial representative and a juror. Id. at 796-97.
64. Id. at 796.
65. Faulconbridge, 142 P.3d at 796.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 797.
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ble for other purposes, the Court creates a situation, potentially
incurable by jury instructions, whereby the jury could take the evidence admitted for other purposes and apportion liability inadvertently. Finally, in future cases where governments seek to
sever liability by pointing the finger at a negligent driver as a superseding cause or to negate causation, Faulconbridge becomes
important precedent as it stands for the rule that it is foreseeable
as a matter of law that a driver will operate a vehicle negligently
on highways.
-Kate McGrath Ellis
II.

WING V. STATE

68

Claimants filing against the State should study Montana
Code Annotated § 2-9-301 very carefully. This statute requires a
petitioner to file a claim with the Department of Administration
(Department) prior to naming the State in a lawsuit. The Department must make a final determination on the claim before the
claimant can file a complaint, which tolls the statute of limitations
for 120 days. 69 The Department's failure to make a decision
within 120 days of the claim is considered a final denial, at which
time the statute of limitations resumes running. 70 According to
the Montana Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Wing, if a
claimant waits to file a claim until the day before the statute of
limitations expires, and the Department fails to make a decision
within 120 days of the claim, the claimant is left with only one day
71
to file a complaint.
On April 27, 2001, Michelle Wing was involved in an automobile accident on Highway 200 in Missoula County. 7 2 Wing filed a
claim with the Department pursuant to Montana Code Annotated
§ 2-9-301(1), 7 3 asserting the State was responsible. 74 Wing maintained that the State's contractor failed to adequately warn of
highway construction, and the lack of warning caused the automobile accident. 75 The Department received the claim on April 26,
68. Wing v. State, 155 P.3d 1224 (Mont. 2007).
69. Mont. Code Ann. § 2-9-301(2) (2007).
70. Id.
71. Wing, 155 P.3d at 1228.
72. Id. at 1226.
73. Mont. Code Ann. § 2-9-301(1) (1999) (statute remains unchanged under the 2007
Montana Code Annotated).
74. Wing, 155 P.3d at 1226.
75. Id.
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the day before the statute of limitations was to expire. 7 7
Her claim was rejected when the Department failed to make a de78
cision within 120 days of filing.
Wing filed a complaint in the Fourth Judicial District Court
on August 26, 2004, two days after the Department's denial. 79 In
its answer, the State raised an affirmative defense claiming the
statute of limitations had run. 0 The State subsequently filed a
motion for summary judgment asserting that Wing failed to file
within the statute of limitations pursuant to Montana Code Annotated §§ 27-2-20481 and 2-9-301(2).82 Although both parties
agreed that the three-year statute of limitations was applicable,
Wing contended she filed a timely complaint, and furthermore,
that the administrative review requirement of Montana Code An83
notated § 2-9-301 was unconstitutionally vague.
The district court ruled in favor of the State's motion for summary judgment. The court further determined that not only was
the administrative review statute constitutional, but the statute
84
of limitations expired the day before Wing filed her complaint.
8
5
Wing appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.
On appeal, Wing first argued Montana Code Annotated § 2-9301 was unconstitutionally vague because a "person of ordinary
intelligence" would not be able to determine whether the statute
of limitations tolls upon the presentation of the claim to the De86
partment or when the Department actually received the claim.
She further argued that the Department's failure to notify the
sender upon receipt of the claim makes it "impossible... to calcu87
late" the beginning of the tolling period.
The Montana Supreme Court found flaws in Wing's reasoning. The Court began by stating there is a presumption that a
"person of average intelligence can comprehend a term of common
2004,76

76. Id.
77. Id. at 1227.
78. Id. at 1226.
79. Id.
80. Wing, 155 P.3d at 1226.
81. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-204 (2007) (providing a 3-year statute of limitations for tort
actions arising from personal injury).
82. Wing, 155 P.3d at 1226.
83. Id. at 1226-27.
84. Id. at 1226.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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usage contained in a statute."8 8 Montana Code Annotated § 2-9301(2) explicitly states that the tolling period begins "[u]pon the
department's receipt of the claim."8 9 The Court concluded a "person of ordinary intelligence" could determine that the word "receipt," used in the context of the statute, means the statute of limitations tolls when the claim is received by the Department. 90 Although the Court recognized that the "receipt" of the claim could
vary depending on the method of delivery, it concluded that 9it1
would not be difficult to determine the exact date of delivery.
The Court cited In re Custody and ParentalRights of D.S., which
held that statutes need not provide " 'precise guidance,' " only a
"'standard of conduct." 9 2
The Court upheld the constitutionality of Montana Code Annotated § 2-9-301. It reasoned that a claimant could do a number
of things to determine the date of delivery and stated that nothing
in the statute requires the claimant to guess the beginning of the
93
tolling period.
Notwithstanding the constitutionality of the statute, Wing
maintained the district court erred in computing the statute of
limitations. 9 4 The Montana Supreme Court, however, used the
plain language of both Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) 95 and
Montana Code Annotated § 2-9-301(2) to affirm the ruling of the
96
district court.
Both parties agreed that the statute of limitations would have
run on April 27, 2004, had Wing not filed a claim with the Department. 9 7 However, as required by Montana Code Annotated § 2-9301(2), Wing first filed her claim with the Department, which received it on April 26, 2004.98 Pursuant to the administrative review statute, this triggered the beginning of the tolling period. 9 9
The Court looked at Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) to
determine when exactly the 120-day tolling period began. 10 0 Rule
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Wing, 155 P.3d at 1227 (citing State v. Trull, 136 P.3d 551, 558 (2006)).
Mont. Code Ann. § 2-9-301(2) (2007).
Wing, 155 P.3d at 1227.
Id.
Id. (citing In re Custody and ParentalRights of D.S., 122 P.3d 1239, 1243 (2005)).
Id.
Id.
Mont. R. Civ. P. 6(a).
Wing, 155 P.3d at 1227-28.
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1226.
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1227-28.
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6(a) explicitly states "the day of the act, event, or default after
which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included." 10 1 The Court used the plain language of this rule to determine that the tolling period began the day after the Department received the claim, which was April 27, 2004, the day that
the statute of limitations would have run. 0 2 Therefore, the Court
explained, the 120-day tolling period lasted until August 24, 2004.
Consequently, the statute of limitations resumed the next day, on
August 25. Because Wing only had one day left prior to filing her
claim with the Department, August 25 was the last day to file her
complaint in district court. By filing on August 26, the Court concluded, Wing filed too late, and the statute of limitations barred
0 3
her from bringing a suit.
This case is a clear example of the importance of basic statutory interpretation. The Montana Supreme Court used the plain
language of Montana Code Annotated §§ 2-9-301 and 27-2-204 to
establish the constitutionality of the former and determine when
the statute of limitations expired for Wing's claim under the latter.
Wing also demonstrates that a petitioner is ultimately accountable for the timeliness of her own complaint, even when
there is an intervening administrative review process required by
statute. Because Wing was prohibited by statute from filing her
complaint until the Department made its decision, Wing could not
have filed until August 25, the day the statute of limitations expired. By waiting to file her claim with the Department on the
day before the statute of limitations would have expired, Wing assumed the risk the Department would wait the full 120 days. If
Wing had filed her claim with the Department earlier, she would
have had more than one day to file a complaint with the District
Court.
-Philip Rohifing

101. Mont. R. Civ. P. 6(a).
102. Wing, 155 P.3d at 1228.
103. Id.
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BITTERROOT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS, LTD. v. WESTERN
10 4
STAR TRUCKS, INC.

In February 2007, the Montana Supreme Court adopted the
lost volume seller theory for damages under breached contracts
for services. 10 5 The Court based its decision on the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, as well as decisions from other jurisdictions,
10 6
Under the
rather than the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
to mitia
duty
has
party
non-breaching
the
rule,
UCC
traditional
10 7 However, the lost
claims.
gate damages in breach of contract
volume seller theory provides a limited exception to the traditional rule: the injured party still has a duty to mitigate its damages, but
[ilf the injured party could and would have entered into [a] subsequent contract, even if the contract had not been broken, and could
have had the benefit of both, he can be said to have "lost volume"
and the subsequent transaction is not a substitute for the broken
contract. 108

Bitterroot International Systems, Ltd. (Bitterroot), a Canadian corporation registered to do business in Montana and based
in Missoula, "provides freight hauling services between the
United States and Canada."' 0 9 Western Star Trucks, Inc. (Western), a Canadian corporation based in Kelowna, British Columbia,
and not registered to do business in Montana, manufactures
trucks and truck parts. 1 0 From the mid-1980s through the mid1990s, Bitterroot contracted with Western to deliver freight from
various locations in the U.S. to Kelowna."'
In 1995, in addition to its freight hauling services, Bitterroot
proposed to perform transportation logistics services for Western. 11 2 Bitterroot subsequently sent Western its "Transportation
Logistics Proposal," a proposed contract for the additional services. 1 3 In April 1996, Western wrote a letter, signed by both
parties, that included new terms not in the original Transporta104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Bitterroot Intl. Sys., Ltd. v. W. Star Trucks, Inc., 153 P.3d 627 (Mont. 2007).
Id. at 640.
Id. at 639-41.
Id. at 640.
Id.; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 cmt. f (1981).
Bitterroot Intl. Sys., 153 P.3d at 632.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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tion Logistics Proposal. 114 Among the new terms was a provision
that allowed either party to terminate the agreement after a 120day notice. 1 15 Bitterroot accepted this version of the contract and
began performance of its services while the parties continued to
116
negotiate the remaining details.
Even though Bitterroot's performance was underway, Western proceeded to discuss its need for logistics services with one of
Western's competitors, Logistics, Inc. (Logix).117 Western and
Logix subsequently signed an agreement in which Logix agreed to
provide logistics services for Western. 1 " Logix notified Bitterroot
of this development.1 1 9 Bitterroot informed Logix that any agreement Logix had reached with Western would encompass the previous agreement between Bitterroot and Western. 120 Western then
informed Bitterroot that it was exercising its 120-day notice of termination. This notice terminated their relationship in October
1997.121
Western and Bitterroot continued to communicate after October 1997, attempting to finalize the details of their agreement, but
these efforts failed. 1 22 In January 1998, Western informed Bitterroot that Logix would handle the entirety of its logistics services,
including making the decision of whether Western would continue
123
using Bitterroot as a carrier.
Two months later, Bitterroot sued Western for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 24
Western filed a motion to dismiss these claims, alleging that the
district court did not have personal jurisdiction over Western and
that Bitterroot failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. 125 The district court denied Western's motion to dismiss
because the facts demonstrated that "both parties [were] transacting business in Montana."1 26 Western then moved for summary
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Bitterroot Intl. Sys., 153 P.3d at 632.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bitterroot Intl. Sys., 153 P.3d at 632.
Id. at 632-33.
Id.
Id. at 633.
Id.
Id.
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127 Western's motion
judgment, arguing that no contract existed.
failed and the district court found128that a contract did in fact exist
between Bitterroot and Western.
At trial, the district court instructed the jury as to the existence of the contract. 129 Furthermore, the district court instructed
the jury on the duty to mitigate damages and on lost volume seller
theory.130 The trial resulted in the jury awarding Bitterroot $2.3
and
million on the basis that Western breached both its contract
1 31
Bitterroot.
with
dealing
fair
and
the covenant of good faith
Western raised four issues on appeal, 3 2 the most significant
of which was whether the jury should have been instructed regarding the lost volume seller theory of damages. Western argued
that the district court erred when it instructed the jury to consider
the lost volume seller theory. 33 For Western to prevail on this
argument, it was required to show that it was prejudiced by the
jury instruction. 3 4 However, "prejudice will not be found [by the
Court] if the jury instructions, in their entirety, state the applicable law of the case.' 35 Because the Court went on to adopt the
lost volume seller theory, the jury instructions did state the applicable law of the case, and consequently Western was not
prejudiced.136

127. BitterrootIntl. Sys., 153 P.3d at 633.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 639.
131. Id. at 633.
132. Id. at 631. The other issues were: (1) whether the district court erred in exercising
personal jurisdiction over Western; (2) whether a contract did in fact exist between the
parties; and (3) whether the district court should have allowed Western to amend its answer to assert the defense of statute of frauds. Id. at 633-34, 637. The Court held that the
district court met the 2-part test for exercising specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: (1) specific jurisdiction was established under Mont. R. Civ. P. 4B(1)(a)
because the plaintiffs cause of action arose from business that the defendant transacted
within the state; and (2) jurisdiction was reasonable pursuant to the Due Process Clause
because the defendant "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in
the forum." Id. at 633-34. It further held that the district court did not err when it found
no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the parties manifested their intent to be
bound by a contract. Id. at 635-36. Finally, the Court held that the district court correctly
denied Western's motion to amend its answer to include a defense of statute of frauds because the motion was made 5 years after litigation commenced and, if granted, would have
caused undue prejudice to Bitterroot. Id. at 637-38.
133. Bitterroot Intl. Sys., 153 P.3d at 638-639.
134. Id. at 639.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 642.
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Western stated three reasons why the lost volume seller theory was inapplicable to this case. First, the Court had not yet
adopted the lost volume seller theory of damages.13 7 In analyzing
the theory, the Court relied on the Restatement, which provides
that "[t]he mere fact that an injured party can make arrangements for the disposition of the goods or services that he was to
supply under the contract does not necessarily mean that by doing
so he will avoid loss."138 The Restatement also provides that when
an "injured party could and would have entered into a subsequent
contract, and could have had the benefit of both" the broken and
the subsequent contract, the party is determined to have "lost volume" and the "subsequent transaction is not a substitute for the
broken contract." 13 9 "The injured party's damages are then based
on the profit that he has lost as a result of the broken contract. '1 40
The lost volume seller theory does not undermine the traditional rule that the non-breaching party cannot recover damages
that could have been reasonably mitigated, either by entering into
a subsequent contract or otherwise. 14 ' Rather, the lost volume
seller theory is a limited exception as it applies only to those who
could have the benefit of both the breached contract and a subse142
quent contract.
The Court ultimately adopted the lost volume seller theory of
damages for three reasons: (1) the Court agreed with the reasoning set forth in the Restatement; (2) the Restatement's reasoning is
in line with the Montana Legislature's previous incorporation of
the lost volume seller theory with regard to contracts for the sale
of goods; 14 3 and (3) the general policy of awarding compensatory
damages in breach of contract claims is "to place a seller in as good
a position as if a buyer had performed." 44
Second, Western argued that, because the lost volume theory
of damages arises from the UCC, it applies only to contracts for
the sale of goods, not to contracts for services. 145 The Court, how137. Id. at 639.
138. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 cmt. d (emphasis added by
Court)).
139. Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 347 cmt. f.
140. Id.
141. Bitterroot Intl. Sys., 153 P.3d at 640.
142. Id.
143. Mont. Code Ann. § 30-2-708(2) (2005) (stating that damages will be based on the
profit the seller would have made from full performance by the buyer if the UCC does not
provide adequate damages to "put the seller in as good a position as performance").
144. Bitterroot Intl. Sys., 153 P.3d at 640.
145. Id.
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ever, adopted the lost volume seller theory from the Restatement,
which provides that the theory "applies with equal force to goods
and services," a theory that "is neither new, nor novel." 14 6 Therefore, this argument was moot.
Finally, Western argued that Bitterroot failed to prove that it
was a lost volume seller. 14 7 The Court adopted the following test
from other jurisdictions to determine whether a party could and
would enter into a subsequent contract, and therefore be allowed
the benefit of being a lost volume seller: "the injured party must
prove: (1) that it possessed the capacity to make additional sales,
(2) that it would have been profitable to make additional sales,
and (3) that it probably would have made additional sales absent
the buyer's breach." 148 Bitterroot satisfied this test by presenting
two key pieces of evidence: it expected to grow at a rate of thirteen
to fourteen percent per year, and it could contract with other carriers to handle excess freight volume if necessary. 1 49 Based on
this evidence, Bitterroot argued that it could have profitably per150
formed the Western contract as well as subsequent contracts.
This evidence supported the jury's determination that Bitterroot
15
was a lost volume seller. '
Western had the burden of proving it was prejudiced by the
jury instructions, which it could not show if the instructions
stated the applicable law of the case.' 5 2 Because the Court
adopted the lost volume seller theory of damages, the jury instructions on mitigation and lost volume seller theory stated the appliits burden, and the
cable law.' 53 Therefore, Western did not meet
54
Court affirmed the district court's decision.'
Bitterroot InternationalSystems establishes that a party who
breaches a contract for services may now be liable under the lost
volume seller theory of damages in Montana. Liability may accrue regardless of whether the non-breaching party actually mitigated its damages. If the non-breaching party can prove that it
was capable of making additional sales and that it probably would
have made those additional sales had the breaching party not
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 641 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 cmt. d (1981)).
Id.
Id. at 639-40.
Id. at 641-42.
Bitterroot Intl. Sys., 153 P.3d at 642.
Id.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 642.
Id.
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breached the contract, the breaching party will be liable for damages based on the lost volume seller theory. Furthermore, because
this holding is based on the Restatement rather than the UCC, the
breaching party cannot claim that the lost volume seller theory
only applies to contracts for goods. Therefore, Montana practitioners must be aware that even though the breaching party may
not be liable for damages that could have reasonably been mitigated by the non-breaching party, it still could be liable under the
lost volume seller theory.
-Christopher T. Sweeney
IV.

STATE V. FRAZIER

15 5

In State v. Frazier, the Montana Supreme Court examined
the narrow issue of whether the Yellowstone County Justice Court
erred in denying Gary Frazier's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. 156 In determining this issue, the Court looked at "case-specific considerations" to determine whether the justice court had
sufficient grounds to deny Frazier's motion to withdraw. 15 7 The
Montana Supreme Court held that the court's act of merely asking
the defendant "if he understood that by pleading guilty he was
admitting to the facts alleged in the notice to appear and complaint," without further investigation, constituted a reversible er8
ror. 15
On June 26, 2005, Frazier was charged with one count of
partner or family member assault (PFMA). 159 The next day, Frazier appeared, without legal counsel, before the Yellowstone
County Justice Court for arraignment. 160 At that time, no plea
agreement had been entered. 16 1 The justice court advised Frazier
of his constitutional rights and the "minimum and maximum penalties for the offense charged."' 62 The court also asked Frazier if
he "understood that by pleading guilty, he was admitting the facts
contained in the notice to appear and complaint.' 163 Frazier ac155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

State v. Frazier, 153 P.3d 18 (Mont. 2007).
Id. at 20.
Id. (quoting State v. Muhammad, 121 P.3d 521, 524 (Mont 2005)).
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Frazier, 153 P.3d at 19.
Id.
Id.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2008

19

Montana Law Review, Vol. 69 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 8

302

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 69

knowledged he understood, then pled guilty. 16 4 However, prior to
accepting Frazier's plea, the Court failed to specifically ask FraFrazier, who was acting pro se,
zier to explain his plea. 16 5 Nor did 166
information.
volunteer this crucial
The next day, Frazier filed a pro se motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. 16 7 The motion stated:
I would like to withdraw my guilty plea and enter a not guilty ple
[sic]. I plead [sic] guilty because I thought it was the fastes [sic] way
to be released from jail, and I would like to talk to a public defender
to know what rights and possibility's [sic] I have. I had neck surgery [sic] on May 17th and am unable to work. My wife is the sole
provider of a family of 5 so we are financual [sic] straped [sic] every
penny brought in goes to our mortgage and daily life for our fam16 8
ily.
16 9 and Frazier
The justice court "summarily denied" this motion,
17 0 After an evidentiary hearing in
appealed to district court.
which Frazier was represented by legal counsel, the district court
through his counsel, aplikewise denied the motion. 17 1 Frazier,172
Court.
pealed to the Montana Supreme
In writing the Court's opinion, Justice Leaphart specifically
noted that Montana Code Annotated § 46-17-203(2)(b) allows a defendant in justice court to move to withdraw a guilty plea if the
plea was not entered voluntarily. 173 In determining whether Frazier's guilty plea was voluntary, the Court considered two key factors: (1) the adequacy of the justice court's interrogation, or plea
colloquy; and (2) whether another charge was dismissed as part of
a plea bargain.1 74 Citing State v. Lone Elk,17 5 the Court considfactor inered the absence of a plea bargain as another pertinent
176
involuntary.
or
dicating whether a plea is voluntary

164. Id. at 19, 23 (Warner, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 19.
166. Id.
167. Frazier, 153 P.3d at 19-20.
168. Id. at 20.
169. Id. at 20-21.
170. Id. at 20.
171. Id. at 20-21.
172. Id. at 20.
173. Frazier,153 P.3d at 20 (citing Mont. Code. Ann. § 46-17-203(2)(b) (2005). The statute was revised effective July 1, 2006, but no changes relevant to this opinion were made.
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-17-203 (2007)).
174. Id. (citing State v. Muhammad, 121 P.3d 521, 524 (Mont. 2005)).
175. State v. Lone Elk, 108 P.3d 500, 505 (Mont. 2005).
176. Frazier, 153 P.3d at 20.
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In analyzing the first factor-the adequacy of the justice
court's interrogation-the Montana Supreme Court first addressed the threshold issue of whether Frazier adequately raised
the plea colloquy issue. 17 7 The Court concluded that he had, for
four reasons. First, Frazier's motion was "summarily denied without a hearing." 1 78 Second, despite Frazier's request, he never received legal representation. 79 The Supreme Court reasoned that
if the justice court had granted Frazier a hearing and counsel,
counsel would have raised the plea colloquy issue, as Frazier's
counsel did at the district court hearing. 8 0o Third, the Court
found Frazier's motion similar to the simplistic motion the defendant in State v. Boucher filed at the justice court level, 8 1 which
also did not specifically raise the inadequate plea colloquy issue.' 8 2 Finally, the Court stated that, as a policy matter, any
doubt whether a plea was involuntary "should be resolved in favor
of the defendant."'1 3 In light of these considerations, the Court
concluded Frazier adequately raised the plea colloquy issue. 8 4
Having concluded that the issue was properly raised, the
Court turned its attention to the adequacy of the justice court's
interrogation. The Court emphasized that Montana law "prohibits a court from accepting a guilty plea 'without determining that
there is a factual basis for the plea in charges of felonies or misdemeanors resulting in incarceration.'
s185Drawing on Lone Elk,
Muhammad, and State v. Warclub, 8 6 the Court interpreted the
statute "as requiring a court to solicit admissions from a defendant regarding what acts the defendant committed that constitute
the offense charged."' 8 7 The court must ask the defendant to explain what he did that constituted the crime.18 8 Based on the justice court's failure to solicit the appropriate information at Fra177. Id. Here, "colloquy" is used to mean "a discussion during a hearing between the
judge and the defendant usually to ascertain the defendant's understanding of his or her
rights and of the court proceedings." Merriam Webster's Dictionary of Law 84 (Linda Picard Wood ed., Merriam Webster, Inc. 1996).
178. Frazier,153 P.3d at 20-21.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. State v. Boucher, 48 P.3d 21, 26-27 (Mont. 2002).
182. Frazier, 153 P.3d at 21.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 46-12-212(1) (2005)).
186. State v. Lone Elk, 108 P.3d 500, 502 (Mont. 2005); State v. Muhammad, 121 P.3d
521, 526 (Mont. 2005); State v. Warclub, 114 P.3d 254, 255-56 (Mont. 2005).
187. Frazier, 153 P.3d at 21.
188. Id.
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zier's arraignment, the Montana Supreme Court found the interrogation inadequate. The Court held the justice court erred when
18 9
it did not allow Frazier to withdraw his guilty plea.
Justice Warner dissented. To him, none of the reasons the
190
majority proffered justified reversing the lower courts' decisions
or addressing an issue that the defendant failed to raise before the
lower courts. 191 He emphasized that "Montana law is well established that 'it is fundamentally unfair to fault the trial court for
failing to rule on an issue it was never given the opportunity to
consider.' 1192 Because Frazier did not initially raise the issue of
the inadequate plea colloquy, Justice Warner reasoned that
neither the justice court nor the district court had a fair opportu9 3 He
nity to address whether Frazier's guilty plea was voluntary.
suggested that "[ilf it is no longer the rule that an issue must be
presented to the trial court before it is brought to this Court...
the bar that the legion of
the Court should so announce and advise
94
overruled."'
are
cases to the contrary
This decision indicates that a lower court's failure to specifically ask a defendant to explain his or her plea, and subsequent
denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea on
grounds it was involuntary, may constitute reversible error, even
when the defendant failed to argue to the lower court that the plea
colloquy was inadequate. Fraziersuggests that thorough plea colloquy may not be routine practice in all trial courts. Thus, the
Montana practitioner should be aware of this requirement in order to ensure that defendants understand what their guilty plea
means, and only enter it voluntarily.
-Zachary Strong
19 5

V.

STATE V. HENDERSHOT

In State v. Hendershot,the Montana Supreme Court held that
the district court abused its discretion when it denied the defen19 6 The Court held
dant's request for appointment of new counsel.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 22 (Warner, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (quoting State v. J.C., 87 P.3d 501, 509 (Mont. 2004)).
Frazier, 153 P.3d at 22.
Id. at 22-23.
State v. Hendershot, 153 P.3d 619 (Mont. 2007).
Id. at 625.
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that the defendant's relationship with his lawyers had deteriorated to such an "irreparable state" that there existed a breakdown of communication and a complete collapse of the attorneyclient relationship. 1 97 The Hendershot decision is significant for
Montana criminal practitioners because it appears to have lowered the defendant's burden for obtaining new counsel, while
broadening the "abuse of discretion" standard of appellate review
for such decisions.
On June 9, 2003, James Hendershot violently assaulted his
wife Denise. 198 The State charged Hendershot with felony aggravated assault, felony assault with a weapon, and misdemeanor
partner or family member assault. The court appointed public defender Mark McLaverty to represent Hendershot.199 Hendershot
20 0
pled not guilty to all charges at his initial court appearance.
Hendershot was on felony probation for a prior theft charge
when the assault occurred. Given the assault charges, the State
moved to revoke Hendershot's probation. 20 1 The district court appointed McLaverty to represent Hendershot in the probation revocation proceedings as well. McLaverty, however, could not attend
Hendershot's revocation hearing due to surgery. Instead, Mike
Montgomery, an associate with McLaverty's law firm, represented
20 2
Hendershot.
At the revocation hearing, Montgomery did not question the
State's witnesses, and Hendershot later alleged that Montgomery
advised him to remain silent. 20 3 Following the presentation of evidence, the district court determined that Hendershot had violated
his probation. Montgomery, on behalf of Hendershot, agreed with
the prosecution's sentencing recommendation of ten years, with
five suspended, with the Department of Corrections (DOC). The
district court, however, accepted the sentencing recommendation
of Hendershot's probation officer and sentenced him to the Mon20 4
tana State Prison for ten years, with five suspended.
The next day, Hendershot wrote a letter to the district court
complaining he had been ineffectively represented at his probation revocation hearing and requesting either a new hearing or a
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 624-25.
Id. at 620.
Id.
Id.
Hendershot, 153 P.3d at 620.
Id.
Id. at 621.
Id. at 620-21.
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sentence change.2 °5 Hendershot alleged that Montgomery had incorrectly thought the revocation hearing was actually Hendershot's initial appearance. Montgomery therefore instructed Hendershot to say nothing, to which Hendershot complied. 20 6 Hendershot also noted Montgomery's failure to question the State's
witnesses or mention his "mental disorder. '20 7 The district court
forwarded Hendershot's letter to McLaverty, but neither the dis20
trict court nor McLaverty responded.
McLaverty subsequently appeared at an omnibus hearing regarding Hendershot's assault charges, where he informed the
court that Hendershot would deny the charges and assert the justifiable use of force defense. 20 9 At a status hearing on September
17, 2003, McLaverty avowed to the Court that he and the State
had reached a plea agreement. 2 10 Based on this representation,
the district court set a change of plea hearing for October 1, 2003.
However, at the change of plea hearing, McLaverty informed the
court that Hendershot would not plead guilty, but in fact wanted
to proceed to trial. 2 11 The district court set Hendershot's trial for

December 8,

2003.212

On October 27, 2003, Hendershot wrote a letter to the district
court requesting a new attorney. Hendershot alleged that
(1) McLaverty had done little or nothing on his behalf; (2)
McLaverty knew that [the prosecutor] had threatened Denise before
the revocation hearing and that Denise had lied about the [assault]
but McLaverty had not acted on this evidence; (3) McLaverty had
not filed a petition for rehearing on Hendershot's behalf as Hendershot had requested, and (4) McLaverty was incompetent. He also
expressed his displeasure with Montgomery, whom he stated was
incompetent, was unprepared for the revocation hearing, and had
that could have elicited a more truthful
not asked his wife questions
2 13
explanation of the events.

In response to Hendershot's letter, the district court set a hearing
for November 12, 2003, to address Hendershot's request for new
205. Id. at 621.
206. Id.
207. Hendershot, 153 P.3d at 621.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Hendershot, 153 P.3d at 621. Between July 16, 2003, the date of Hendershot's probation revocation hearing, and September 11, 2003, Denise wrote at least 7 letters to Judge
Langton. Among her numerous allegations, Denise alleged that her injuries were not serious, and that "not all of them were inflicted by her husband." Id.
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counsel. At the hearing, Hendershot reasserted his allegations
concerning Montgomery's representation at the probation revocation hearing, as well as Denise's alleged false testimony and coer2 14
cion by the State.
Montgomery again appeared at the hearing, on behalf of
McLaverty, and responded to Hendershot's allegations that "as
public servants, they try to give the best representation to their
clients but that frequently the clients do not like to hear what they
have to say."2 15 Montgomery also avowed to the district court that
communication had " 'broken down to such an irreparable state'"
2 16
that further representation was not possible.
The State contended that Hendershot had fabricated his complaints regarding his attorneys to manipulate the system and
frustrate prosecution, noting that Hendershot did not complain of
his counsel's representation for three and a half months. Hendershot responded that he had attempted to get McLaverty to "re2 17
present him vigorously," to no avail.
As a consequence of requesting substitute counsel, Hendershot agreed that appointment of new counsel would delay the
trial. Hendershot, however, refused to waive his speedy trial
right, citing the need for advice from counsel before making such a
decision. 2 18 In response to Hendershot's allegations, the district
court stated:
I guess where I'm at here, Mr. Hendershot, is I don't find your
allegations particularly credit worthy and I don't find you a particularly credible person and I think your complaints, particularly the
timing of your complaints, [are] motivated more by procedural
gamesmanship than true dissatisfaction with your attorney. I respect Mr. Montgomery's statement here of your allegations of damage to the fabric of your attorney-client relationship with him, but
that's something that you've caused. I don't think it's been caused
by your attorneys.
If you're unwilling to waive your right to a speedy trial, then I
have an obligation to see that you get one. So I'm going to deny your
attorney's request to be relieved and deny your request for a change

of attorney .... 219
The district court received a letter from Hendershot the morning of trial requesting a continuance, which it subsequently de214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 621-22.
Id. at 622 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hendershot, 153 P.3d at 622.
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nied. Hendershot's trial was held on December 8 and 9, 2003, and
the jury convicted him of all three assault charges. The district
court sentenced Hendershot to ten years with DOC, with five
years suspended, to run consecutive to his theft sentence. 2 20 Hen221
dershot appealed the denial of his request for new counsel.
Applying the "abuse of discretion" standard, the Montana Supreme Court determined that the district court had "act[ed] arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeded
the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice"22 2 in denying Hendershot new counsel. State v. Gallagher (Gallagher1)223
and State v. Gallagher(GallagherH1)224 comprise Montana's controlling law regarding a defendant's request for new counsel. Notably, "[i]t is within the sound discretion of the district court to
rule on requests for the appointment of new counsel." 2 25 When a
defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, the district
court must make an adequate initial inquiry regarding the substantiality of the defendant's complaints. 2 26 If the district court
determines that the defendant has presented "seemingly substantial complaints regarding [his] counsel," the district court must
22 7
then hold a hearing to address the validity of the complaints.
At the hearing, the defendant must present material facts to
establish a "total lack of communication." 228 "Bare unsupported
allegations are insufficient to meet this burden."2 29 If the defendant successfully demonstrates that the attorney-client relationship has completely collapsed, the district court must substitute
new counsel to protect the defendant's federal and state constitu230
tional rights to effective assistance of counsel.
The Montana Supreme Court determined that Hendershot
had demonstrated a complete collapse of the attorney-client relationship. 23 1 Hendershot made numerous complaints regarding
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 623 (citing Gallagher11, 19 P.3d at 819).
223. State v. Gallagher,955 P.2d 1371 (Mont. 1998) [hereinafter Gallagher I].
224. State v. Gallagher,19 P.3d 817 (Mont. 2001) [hereinafter GallagherII].
225. GallagherI, 955 P.2d at 1373 (citing City of Billings v. Smith, 932 P.2d 1058, 1060
(Mont. 1997); State v. Craig, 906 P.2d 683, 688 (Mont. 1995); State v. Morrison, 848 P.2d
514, 516 (Mont. 1993)).
226. Hendershot, 153 P.3d at 623-24 (citing Gallagher1, 955 P.2d at 1374).
227. Id. at 623.
228. Id. at 624 (citing Gallagher11, 19 P.3d at 820).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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his counsel's representation, including "McLaverty's failure to appear at the revocation hearing, his failure to respond to Hendershot's attempts at correspondence, and his meeting with Hendershot only once in the five months McLaverty represented him. 2 3 2
Hendershot also noted McLaverty's incorrect assertion that he intended to plead guilty, when no such plea had ever been discussed
between them, as well as McLaverty's absence at the legal representation hearing. Hendershot further argued that the district
court failed to examine his communication breakdown with
McLaverty, but instead improperly focused on the timeliness of
23 3
his request for new counsel.
The Montana Supreme Court held that the district court
abused its discretion by denying Hendershot's request for new
counsel, specifically relying on the following facts: (1) McLaverty
failed to attend either of the two substantive procedural hearings-the probation revocation hearing or the legal representation
hearing-sending his associate Montgomery in his stead (although the Court acknowledged that "knee surgery is a valid excuse" 23 4); (2) McLaverty ignored Hendershot's request for a visit
at the prison; (3) McLaverty scheduled a change of plea hearing
without discussing the plea arrangement with Hendershot; (4)
Montgomery failed to question the prosecution's witnesses at the
probation revocation hearing, instructing Hendershot to remain
silent and joining the State's sentencing recommendation; and (5)
Montgomery joined in Hendershot's request for severance of the
attorney-client relationship, avowing to the district court that
"communications between attorney and client had reached 'an irreparable state,' " and that the firm "wouldn't be able to go for235

ward."

The Montana Supreme Court also found that Hendershot
"made repeated complaints about the relationship between him
and his counsel" dating back to the day after his probation revocation hearing and "well in advance of trial."2 36 The Court dismissed the district court's findings that Hendershot was not a
credible person and that he had caused the communication break23 7
down with his counsel.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Hendershot, 153 P.3d at 623.
Id.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 624-25.
Id.
Id. at 625.
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In an impassioned dissent, Justice Warner assailed the majority for "pay[ing] lip service to the rules [announced in Strickland,238 Wilson,239 Gallagher1240 and Gallagher 11241], not fairly
constru[ing] the record and inexpiably gloss[ing] over the trial
judge's findings of fact."24 2 The dissent detailed a number of facts
in the record which supported the district court's findings, contrary to the view espoused by the majority. Significantly, substantial evidence supported the district court's findings that Hendershot's allegations were not credible. Many of Hendershot's other
complaints regarded matters reasonably viewed as sound trial
strategy, such as Montgomery's instruction to Hendershot to remain silent at the probation revocation hearing, or his decision
not to question witnesses. One of Hendershot's letters stated that
he met with Montgomery prior to the probation revocation hearing. Hendershot knew Montgomery would appear for McLaverty,
a fact which he never objected to at the probation revocation hear3
ing.24
Hendershot complained that "Montgomery told him not to say
anything when he wanted to apologize to Denise and the Court;
Montgomery asked no questions of the witnesses; and Montgomery did not mention that he had a mental disorder which 'to a
large degree' caused the altercation between himself and Denise."24 4 However, Montgomery's instruction to Hendershot to remain silent was a sound trial strategy, because Hendershot later
pled not guilty to the assault charges causing Denise's injuries.
"It would be, to say the least, difficult at a later trial to claim he
had not hurt her if he had apologized on the record for doing
so."245 Similarly, the purported mental illness would also be inconsistent with a denial of the charges. And what questions could
Montgomery have possibly asked of the witnesses during the probation revocation proceeding? "The State had photographs of the
severe injuries inflicted on Denise, which proved her testimony
was accurate. There was no viable defense to the allegations at
238. Strickland v.Wash., 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
239. Wilson v. State, 989 P.2d 813 (Mont. 1999).
240. GallagherI, 955 P.2d 1371 (Mont. 1998).
241. GallagherII, 19 P.3d 817 (Mont. 2001).
242. Hendershot, 153 P.3d at 625 (Warner, Rice & Harkin, JJ., dissenting (District Court
Judge Douglas G. Harkin sitting for Justice Morris)).
243. Id. at 625-27.
244. Id. at 626.
245. Id.
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that time."24 6 The dissent concluded that the district court's findings were "not arbitrary, and did not exceed the bounds of reason."247

Hendershot's delay in requesting new counsel, his refusal to
waive his speedy trial rights, and the circumstances surrounding
his request for a continuance further bolstered the district court's
finding that Hendershot was attempting to manipulate the court
to obtain a dismissal of his conviction. Montgomery disagreed
with Hendershot's characterization of his and McLaverty's representation. Notably, Montgomery, not Hendershot, "used the
magic word, 'communication,' " and neither provided the district
court with "specifics of how communication was lacking, or why
representation could not be effectively continued." 248 Hendershot
avowed to the district court, during argument on his motion for a
continuance, that he had retained another attorney and was prepared to waive his speedy trial rights. However, Hendershot's alleged new attorney appeared before the district court at the conclusion of the first day of trial, and informed the court that, contrary to Hendershot's assertion, he had not been retained as
2 49
counsel.
In sum, the dissent relied on the trial record, which contained
ample evidence to support the district court's conclusion that "the
reason Hendershot wanted new counsel was not because he and
McLaverty could not communicate, or because McLaverty had not
represented him properly, [but] because he wanted a delay so that
he could possibly secure a dismissal of the charge for lack of a
speedy trial."2 50 The dissent concluded with stern warning that
25 1
the law invests district courts with great latitude in judgment,
and courts can ill afford to "countenance manipulative tactics at
'2 52
the expense of the efficient administration of justice.
The Hendershot decision raises several important issues for
criminal law practitioners in Montana. First, the defendant's burden of proof required for requesting appointment of new counsel
appears to have been lowered. As the dissent noted, neither Hendershot nor his appointed counsel provided the district court any
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Hendershot, 153 P.3d at 626.
249. Id. at 627.
250. Id.
251. Id. (citing Burns v. Plum Creek Timber Co., 885 P.2d 508, 509 (Mont. 1994); Gallagher 11, 19 P.3d 817, 821 (Mont. 2001)).
252. Id. (citing State v.Craig, 906 P.2d 683, 691 (Mont. 1995)).
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specific evidence of how communication had broken down, or why
representation could not continue. 25 3 In fact, Montgomery provided the district court a different and contrary interpretation of
his representation than Hendershot's version. Montgomery, however, eventually bolstered Hendershot's request for new counsel,
using the "magic word, 'communication.' "254 Thus, Hendershot's
bare unsupported allegations provided the only real foundation for
his request. Given that Hendershot bore the burden of demonstrating the "complete collapse" of the attorney-client relationship,
as well as the "irreparable state" of communication, it appears
that his "unsupported allegations" were sufficient for obtaining
new counsel.
Furthermore, counsel may be able to release himself from representation by using the "magic word[s]" of "complete collapse"
and "irreparable communication breakdown," without providing
any evidence to substantiate the claim. 2 55 Montgomery's statements were clearly contradictory, and the gist of his argument
was that Hendershot did not want to hear that he would be con2 56
victed, despite the overwhelming evidence against him.
Finally, the Hendershot decision calls into question the standard of review for a ruling on a substitution of counsel. The
"sound discretion" of district courts should not be overturned unless the district court "acted arbitrarily without employment of
conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice." 25 7 However, the Montana Supreme
Court effectively ignored this extraordinarily deferential standard
of appellate review, instead substituting its own judgment for that
of the lower court. As the dissent noted, the majority relied upon
a selective reading of the record, while ignoring the district court's
findings, to bolster its own judgment that the district court abused
its discretion when it denied the defendant's request for substitution of counsel. Such a practice of appellate review cannot be
countenanced. District courts deserve the greater deference they
are accorded under appellate review law.
-Myles

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

A. Braccio

Id.
Hendershot, 153 P.3d at 626.
Id.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 623 (majority) (citing Gallagher 11, 19 P.3d 817, 819 (Mont. 2001)).
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